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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This paper analyzes the steady-state distribution of tax burdens ofa
Value Added Tax (VAT) in the United States using a lifetimeperspec-
tive. In contrast to an annual snapshot perspective, I find that a VATon
total expenditures would be proportional over the lifetime. Various modi-
fications to the VAT (zero rating necessities or lump-sum household
rebates) would increase the progressivity of the tax substantially. How-
ever, the additional progressivity comes at the cost of substantial tax
revenue.
1. INTRODUCTION
Over the past twenty-five years most developed countries have adopted
some form of a Value Added Tax (VAT). Moreover, this tax has become
This paper has been prepared for the NBER Tax Policy and the Economy conference to be
held in Washington, DC, on November 16, 1993. jim Poterba provided useful comments
on an earlier draft. Andrew Clarkson provided excellent research assistance.46Metcalf
an important source of revenue in many of thosecountries.1 The argu-
ments on its behalf are well known. A VAT can raise significant amounts
of revenue. The U.S. Congressional Budget Office (1993) estimates that a
broad-based VAT imposed at a 5 percent rate in the United States begin-
ning in 1995 could raise close to $70 billion in its first year. Even after
exempting food, housing, and medical care, the VAT would still raise
roughly $36 billion in its first year. In addition, a VAT does not distort
current and future consumption decisions. Put differently, the returns to
saving are untaxeda feature that has made consumption taxes like a
VAT attractive to policy makers concerned with the level of savings in
the United States.2
Despite these facts and despite a number of efforts to introduce a VAT
in this country, the United States does not employ a VAT, for two
important reasons. First, many are suspicious that a VAT would be a
"money machine." That is, it would be a "hidden" tax raising large sums
of money and would ease pressure on Congress and the president to
reduce federal spending. Second, others view the VAT as a highly regres-
sive tax.3
This paper takes up the second issuewhether a value added tax
would be regressive. Viewed in the context of a single year, a VAT does
in fact look quite regressive. However, when viewed in the context of a
taxpayer's lifetime, a VAT looks decidedly less regressive and in fact can
look quite progressive under different design schemes. In the next sec-
tion, I review the literature on the incidence of consumption taxes and
discuss the importance of the lifetime perspective. Section 3 presents the
essential results of the paper. Using the 1990 Consumer Expenditure
Survey (CEX), I estimate the incidence of a VAT using annual income
and current consumption as my two income measures. Here I find that a
broad-based VAT looks essentially proportional when a taxpayer's re-
sources over the course of a lifetime areconsidered. I then consider how
1In 1986 West Germany raised 14 percent of its total tax revenue from a VAT while the
United Kingdom raised 18 percent and Denmark 27 percent (Tait, 1988).
2It has also been argued (incorrectly) that a VAT would help improve the trade balance.
With appropriate border adjustments, a VAT is neutral with respect to trade (see Gross-
man, 1980). A VAT could encourage net exports if used to reduce reliance ondirect taxes,
for which some of the burden might be passed forward to consumers and result in higher
export prices.
In addition, there are fears that a VAT would be inflationary, that it would hinder state
and local governments' ability to raise money through sales taxes, and that it would be
difficult to administer. It is by no means clear why a one-time price increase would fuel
inflation. As for the other two concerns, these are design considerations that would need
to be addressed if a VAT were implemented. Note, though, that a VATwith a state-
revenue sharing component could reduce sales-tax tensions of the type currentlytaking
place between New York and New Jersey (New York Times, December 9, 1992).Value Added Tax 47
bequests affect this result. Over a lifetime, the present discounted value
of labor earnings must equal the present discounted value of consump-
lion plus net bequests given (net of bequests received). It is by no means
clear how a broad-based consumption tax would affect the value of
bequests even if they are not directly taxed. I consider one extreme
scenario, namely, that bequests given are not subject to nor affected bya
value added tax. Accounting for bequests in this fashion does not affect
the central finding of proportionality in any significant way.
Section 4 considers various ways to increase the progressivity ofa
VAT. I find that a VAT could be easily modified in ways that would
substantially increase the progressivity of the tax. Section 5 concludes.
2. CONSUMPTION TAX BURDENS
As is well known, the statutory incidence of a tax can differ markedly
from its economic incidence. Despite the number of ways that a VATcan
be administered, the tax is generally considered to be a tax on consump-
tion.4 The final incidence of a tax will depend on whether it is passed
forward (economic incidence on consumers), backward (economic inci-
dence on factors of productioncapital and labor), or in some combina-
lion of forward and backward shifting. Early studies (e.g., Musgrave,
Case, and Leonard (1974) and Pechman (1985)) take the results froma
wide number of empirical studies to make judgments about the appropri-
ate shifting of individual taxes and conclude that consumption taxes are
passed forward to and borne by consumers in proportion to their expen-
ditures. In these studies, families are ranked according to their annual
income, and average tax shares by decile or quintile are computed.
These studies find that average tax rates for existing consumption taxes
in the United States (federal excise taxes, state and local sales and excise
taxes) fall with income: consumption taxes are regressive.
As an alternative to the approach used by Pechman and others,
Ballard, Scholz, and Shoven (1987) used a computable general equilib-
rium (CGE) model that allows for relative prices to change in response to
changes in tax systems to study a VAT. They estimate that a VAT intro-
duced as a partial substitute for the personal income tax would produce
welfare losses for lower-income groups and welfare gains for higher-
income groups. Such a shift in taxation would be regressive.5
See U.S. Congressional Budget Office (1992) for a good discussion of the ways a VAT
could be administered.
Pechman assumes that the system of sales and excise taxes in the United States would be
replaced by a lump-sum tax. The regressivity of the tax shift in Ballard, Scholz, and Shoven
is partially due to the use of a VAT and partially due to the decreased reliance on the
income tax with its progressive rate schedule.48Metcalf
Recently, there has been considerable interest in measuring the life-
time incidence of consumption taxes. There are two reasons for this
interest. First, annual income can fluctuate substantially. Given people's
ability to save and spend accumulated savings, annual income may not
be a good measure of an individual's ability to consume in a given year.
Friedman (1957) formalized this notion in his Permanent Income Hy-
pothesis (PIH), arguing that people make consumption decisions based
on an unobservable measure of permanent income.If the purpose of a
distributional analysis is to group and rank people by a measure of their
economic welfare, permanent income is probably a better measure than
annual income. Fluctuations in annual income tends to make a consump-
tion tax look more regressive than it would be if we measured and
ranked people by permanent income. Someone with a positive shock to
income (e.g., winning the lottery) will appear "rich" and have a low
consumption to income ratio (and hence a low consumption tax to in-
come ratio), whereas someone with a negative shock (e.g., experiencing
a temporary spell of unemployment) will appear "poor" andhave a high
consumption tax to income ratio.
Furthermore, life-cycle considerations suggest that we should view
individuals by their lifetime income (viz., Modigliani and Brumberg,
1954). People tend to earn low amounts of income (relative to their
average income over their lifetime) in their youth as well as in old age. In
a cross-sectional analysis, lower-income groups willinclude not only
poor people (in a lifetime sense) but also young and old people who are
not poor in a lifetime sense but are making consumption decisions based
on their future ability to earn or on their past earning history.The
difficulties with measuring income at the low end of the distribution are
well understood by economists.6
Recognizing the difficulties with using annual income as a measure of
ability to pay, economists have conducted distributional analyses using
life-cycle models in which a measure of lifetime income is used to rank
households. The challenge in this approach is to measure the unobserv-
able, variable-lifetime income: the present discounted value of earned
income plus gifts received. Lifetime income W can be measured in one of
two ways. As equation (1) shows, we can measure W on the sources or
on the uses side:
t=T E + G t=T + B w=
=,(1 + p)t° =(1 + p)ttO
(1)
6 Pechman resolved this measurement problem by discarding the lowest 5 percent of the
families in the income distribution from his sample.Value Added Tax49
On the sources side, lifetime income is the present discounted value of
earned income E and bequests received G, while on the uses side, it
equals the present discounted value of consumption C and bequests
made B.
Poterba (1989, 1991) has proposed using a measure of consumption as
a proxy for lifetime income in studies of federal excise taxes. Under the
assumption that consumption tends to be smoother than income, total
annual consumption is likely to be a better measure of well-being than is
annual income. This approach measures lifetime income from the uses
side. Metcalf (1993) has used a similar approach to analyze state and
local tax systems. In general, these studies find that consumption taxes
are less regressive from a life-cycle perspective than from an annual
perspective.
Fullerton and Rogers (1993) have conducted an extensive study of life-
time incidence of the U.S. tax system; in effect, they've "redone"
Pechman in a lifetime setting. They construct a measure of lifetime income
by estimating age-income profiles for different demographic groups and
use it to impute a stream of wage rates from which their lifetime income
can be constructed. They measure lifetime income on the sources side.7
Fullerton and Rogers find that the system of federal, state, and local sales
and excise taxes in the United States is roughly as regressive in a life-cycle
perspective as in an annual perspective. This finding cannot be easily
carried over to a VAT. The tax rates facing consumers in their study range
widely from 0 (housing) to 79 percent (tobacco). Much of the regressivity
is due to the fact that necessities tend to be taxed at higher rates than
luxury goods.8 Presumably, a VAT would be structured differently.
Policy makers may be apprehensive about an approach that must
make heroic assumptions about future income and consumption streams
to assess the distributional impact of a consumption tax. The U.S. Con-
gress Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) (1993) recently considered this
issue and proposed a five-year window to approximate lifetime income.
This approach probably deals well with the problem of transitory fluctua-
tions to income but does not capture life-cycle considerations very well.
The JCT found that nearly 90 percent of the observations in their study
were in a five-year, average-income decile that was within one decile of
their annual income decile. They concluded that single-year income mea-
They estimate wage profiles rather than earned income profiles in order to include leisure
as a consumption good.
Fullerton and Rogers's results are also somewhat sensitive to their use of a Stone-Geary
utility function. Varying the minimum required purchase has a large effect on the mea-
sured regressivity of consumption taxes.50Metcalf
sures are reasonably good measures for permanent income (p. 86). This
finding contrasts sharply with Fullerton and Rogers's analysis, however;
they find that less than half (46%) of the individuals in their sample are
in a lifetime-income decile within one decile of their annual income
decile. Fullerton and Rogers's finding indicates that a five-year income
measure may not be a good proxy for lifetime income and that analyses
based on lifetime income measures may give substantially different re-
sults than analyses based on annual income measures.
3. THE DISTRIBUTION OF A VAT
In this section, I consider the distribution of a 5 percent value added tax
introduced as an additional tax with no change in government expendi-
tures, using data from the 1990 Consumer Expenditure Survey.9 I will
assume that the burden of a VAT is borne by consumers and compute
the tax burden as the statutory rate multiplied by the dollar amount of
consumption. 10 The forward-shifting assumption is consistent with pre-
vious work by Pechman (1985), Musgrave, Case, and Leonard (1974),
and others. In addition, I will measure taxes at the household level.
Data for the analysis come from the 1990 CEX family expenditure files.
The CEX interviews families once every three months for five quarters.
Information from the second through fifth interviews is publicly available
and can be used to construct estimates of annual consumption.11 New
households enter the sample every quarter and depart after their fifth
interview. Families interviewed in a given quarter are asked about
consumption over the last three months. Because families may be inter-
viewed at any date within the quarter, data from the previous three-
month period can be included in the current quarter. Thus, families
interviewed in the first quarter of 1990 may report some expenditures
from the last quarter of 1989. Similarly, families interviewed in the first
quarter of 1991 may report expenditures from 1990. I use families who
report complete income information, are interviewed for all four quarters
(that are publicly released), and who enter the sample in either the first or
second quarter of 1990. This gives me 1,561 observations for my sample.
This is an absolute incidence experiment. I do not consider what is done with the
revenue raised by the tax.
10In latter parts of the paper, I consider deductions as well as lump-sum subsidies. Most
VATs are administered by the invoice method in which the tax is paid at each stage of
manufacture on total value with a credit allowed for taxes paid at previous stages. From the
viewpoint of determining the tax burden, this method is equivalent to implementing a
VAT as a retail sales tax at the national level.
11There is also a diary component to the study. I do not use this part of the CEX.TABLE 1.




income consumption with bequests
Summary statistics from 1990 Consumer Expenditure Survey. Annual income is the before-tax income
measure reported in the CEX. Current consumption is total expenditures with two sets of adjustments.
First, shelter costs for home owners, new vehicle purchases, life-insurance premiums, and pension
contributions are subtracted from total expenditures. Second, annual rental values for owner-occupied
housing and vehicles are added back in. See text for more details as well as the adjustment for current
consumption with bequests.
X25 refers to the value at the 25th percentile, X75 refers to the value at the 75th percentile. There are
1,561 observations in the data set.
To compare annual and lifetime measures, I use annual income be-
fore tax for the annual measure and current consumption as a measure
of lifetime income. The before-tax income measure comes from the 1990
CEX. I construct current consumption as total expenditures (as re-
ported in the CEX) minus new vehicle purchases, housing costs for
homeowners, and contributions for pensions and life insurance. These
deductions are in large part a form of savings. To measure the con-
sumption component of housing and automobiles, I include an im-
puted rental value for owner-occupied housing (reported in the CEX)
and impute an automobile-consumption value using an approach of
Cutler and Katz (1991).12
Table 1 provides summary statistics on current consumption and in-
come for my sample; Table 2 presents the cutoff values for each decile.
Mean income at $34,794 is substantially higher than mean current con-
sumption at $27,780 (ignore the last column for now). The skew in
income is apparent: mean income is 25 percent greater than the median
while mean consumption is only 15 percent greater than median con-
sumption. Income is also more variable. The coefficient of variation for
the income measure is .75 but only .58 for current consumption. Note
also that annual income minus current consumption is negative for the
lowest three deciles and increases monotonically with consumption (or
12 See the appendix for details on the construction of automobile consumption. For rent-
ers, I include their rent payment.
Mean 34,794 27,780 31,696
Median 27,900 24,140 26,622
Standard deviation 26,155 16,189 19,233
X25 14,994 16,585 18,791
X75 47,685 35,676 38,709
Coefficient of variation .75 .58 .6152Metcalf
TABLE 2.
Boundary Values for Deciles.
This table reports the upper limit values for the deciles in three different income measures from the 1990
Consumer Expenditure Survey. For example, 8,536 is the maximum value for the first annual-income
decile. The values reported for the 10th decile are the maximum values in the sample.
income). Presumably, consumption exceeds income for many in the
lowest deciles because annual income for many of these households has
been reduced by an income shock that is not expected to persist over
time.
Table 3 is a tabulation of current consumption against income. Roughly
9 percent of the households in the lowest income decile have current
consumption above median consumption in the sample. In addition, 36
percent of the households are in a consumption decile at least two deciles
away from their income decile. This dispersion of consumption within
income deciles should make one cautious about using income as a mea-
sure of well-being.
Another way to see the difficulties associated with using annual in-
come in an incidence analysis is depicted in Figure 1. I computed the
median ratio of total expenditures to before-tax income by age of head of
household and graphed this variable against age. As the life-cycle model
predicts, all but one of the observations in which the median ratio ex-
ceeds one are for ages below twenty-five and above sixty. In addition, I
regressed this ratio against age, age squared, and age cubed.13 Figure 1
also shows the graph of the predicted ratio against age. The graph has
'I also ran the regression with age raised to the fourth. The t statistic on this variable was
1.1. The graph of predicted expenditures to income against age looks very similar to the









1 8,536 10,729 13,174
2 12,400 14,639 16,827
3 17,572 18,131 20,397
4 22,725 20,926 23,294
5 27,870 24,131 26,622
6 35,402 28,216 30,878
7 43,319 32,796 35,724
8 53,012 38,207 41,455
9 68,410 49,898 57,831
10 190,360 152,324 182,484Value Added Tax53
TABLE 3.
Consumption versus Income in the 1990 Consumer Expenditure Survey.
This table presents a tabulation of annual income against current consumption from the 1990 Consumer
Expenditure Survey. Cell entries are the probability of being in a consumption decile, conditional on
being in a given income decile. Consumption is net of expenditures on automobiles and housing
and inclusive of rental equivalents for those durables. Pension and life-insurance contributions are
excluded.
The probabilities in bold face give the probability of being in the same consumption decile as a house-
hold's income decile for each income decile. There are 1,561 observations in the data set.
peaks at age eighteen and seventy-eight, once again suggesting that the
young and the old are making expenditure decisions taking variables
other than current income into account.
One problem with the consumption measure described above is that it
does not include bequests. Lifetime income on the uses side consists of
consumption plus bequests given. As Menchik and David (1982) have
noted, a VAT would likely exempt bequests from taxation. How one
should think about bequests when constructing a VAT is not entirely
clear. Bequest behavior can be categorized in the following ways: acci-
dental, altruistic, "warm glow," and strategic. Bernheim (1987) finds
little support for either accidental or altruistic bequests.14 One can reason-
ably think of "warm glow" and strategic bequests as a form of consump-
tion that should be taxed. To the extent that the bequest is worth less to
the recipient (because it is taxed upon consumption), the bequest is also
14 It is not clear how one would think about these forms of bequests with a VAT. If
bequests are accidental, should one consider them as lifetime income or as a form of
untaxed consumption? If bequests are altruistic, one must reconsider the lifetime approach
to measuring tax incidence. Altruism suggests that the lifetime of a dynasty is the appropri-
ate measure rather than the lifetime of a member of the dynasty.
Income Consumption deciles
deciles 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 53.219.2 7.7 6.4 4.5 3.9 1.9 1.9 1.3 0.0
2 30.830.813.512.2 5.8 2.6 1.9 2.6 0.0 0.0
3 9.024.423.116.0 7.7 9.6 5.1 1.9 1.9 1.3
4 6.414.125.018.017.3 5.1 7.0 4.5 1.9 0.6
5 0.6 6.414.717.317.319.212.8 6.4 1.3 3.8
6 0.0 3.8 4.514.726.317.317.310.3 3.8 1.9
7 0.0 1.3 7.712.210.917.319.916.010.3 4.5
8 0.0 0.0 2.6 1.9 7.714.119.225.621.8 7.0
9 0.0 0.0 0.6 1.3 1.9 7.711.520.532.024.4





















FIGURE 1. Consumption to Income Profile
worth less to the donor. Put differently, one could argue that these
forms of bequests are in fact taxed by a VAT.
Rather than argue that a VAT actually does tax bequests, I proceed by
providing an alternative measure of current consumption that includes
an annualized value of bequests. In the analysis below, I do not assume
that bequests are part of the tax base, the better to consider whether
including bequests as part of the income measure affects the distribu-
tional effects of the tax. To understand the importance of bequests,
consider equation (2) below, which rewrites the uses side of the lifetime-
income definition:
W0=B+C, (2)
where B is the present discounted value of bequests given and C the
present discounted value of consumption. Current consumption can
serve as a proxy for C; my tax base is misspecified by ignoring B. To add
bequests to the tax base, I rely on work by Menchik and David (1982).
The first column of Table 4 reproduces Table 4 of their article. Using an
extensive data set on income-tax returns and probate records, they con-
70 90
20 40 60 80Note: 4 represents the ratio of lifetime bequests to lifetime income and is reproduced from Menchik and
David (1982), Table 4. The second column represents one plus the ratio of annualized bequests to
current consumption.





We can also think of 4, as the ratio of annualized bequests to the sum of
annualized bequests and current consumption. Equation (3) can be re-
written in terms of annualized bequests and current consumption as
B 4,
C1-4,




=1+-H 1+ C=t )c (5) ,(1-4,
The second column of Table 4 reports the ratio 1/(1 - 4,), which serves as
an adjuster to measure true lifetime income on an annual basis. Bequests
as a ratio of income are U-shaped with a trough at about the 80th percen-


















Distribution of a VAT on Total Expenditure.
Note: This table reports median tax rates by dedile for different income measures. VAT liabilities per
household are computed as 5 percent of total expenditures in the 1990 Consumer Expenditure Survey.
Tax rates are computed as the ratio of VAT liability to the appropriate income measure. Households are
sorted by the income measure and the median tax rate within each decile reported. There are 1,561
observations in the data set.
with the adjustment falling to 8.5 percent in the 8th decile. It then rises
sharply with bequests, increasing by 20 percent in the top decile.15
The last column of Table 1 provides summary statistics on the bequest-
adjusted consumption variable. Mean consumption is now roughly
$4,000 higher than when bequests are ignored and median about $2,500
higher. 16 Table 5 presents distributional results for a 5 percent VAT on
total expenditures for the three measures of income: annual income, cur-
rent consumption, and bequest adjusted current consumption. House-
holds are sorted by the appropriate income measure and allocated to
deciles.17 The average VAT tax rate is computed for each household and
15It may be surprising that the bequest-to-lifetime-income ratio is not monotonic in in-
come. However, there is no reason to believe that it should be. A monotonically increasing
relationship implies that the elasticity of bequests with respect to lifetime income is greater
than one. Although various theories of bequests can help explain why the elasticity should
be positive, no theory requires that bequests be a luxury good.
16Kotlikoff (1988) estimates reported transfers of $45.5 billion in 1974 or 3.1 percent of
GDP. Grossing this number up to 1990 using the 1990 GDP yields a per capita value of
transfers of $689. Assuming 2.7 people per household (1990 value) yields an estimate of
$1,860 in annual transfers per household.
For households in a few deciles, adjusting consumption for bequests may move them
into a different decile. I use an iterative procedure to correct for this problem.




1 7.07 5.00 3.85
2 5.66 5.00 4.21
3 5.29 4.95 4.37
4 4.33 4.92 4.40
5 4.31 4.79 4.35
6 3.96 5.08 4.61
7 3.83 4.99 4.58
8 3.61 4.99 4.59
9 3.51 5.09 4.39
10 3.15 5.09 4.25the median is identified within each decile. Using annual income to rank
households leads to a VAT looking distinctly regressive. Median tax rates
fall from 7.1 percent in the lowest decile to 3.2 percent in the highest
decile. The story dramatically changes, however, when current consump-
tion is used to rank households and construct tax rates. Now, the lowest
decile faces a median tax rate of 5 percent while the highest faces a median
rate of 5.1 percent. Furthermore, there is no distinct pattern to rates
moving from the lowest to highest decile. This pattern is very similar to
results shown in Caspersen and Metcalf (1993) using the 1988 CEX.18
Adjusting consumption for bequests (but not subjecting bequests to a
VAT) does not alter the results very much. Median tax rates fall by about
1.2 percent at the bottom and 0.8 percent at the top of the distribution and
fall about 0.4 percent in the 7th and 8th deciles. It does not appear that
excluding bequests in the construction of a proxy for permanent income
affects the results significantly.
The results in Table 5 suggest that a broad-based VAT would be
roughly proportional if viewed over the life cycle. So far I have not
considered variations on the basic VAT to alter its progressivity. In the
next section, I take up this subject, first considering reasonable catego-
ries of expenditures that would not be subject to a VAT and then varia-
tions on a VAT.
4. ALTERING A VAT'S DISTRIBUTION
Few countries subject all expenditures to a value added tax. Of the
twenty-one countries surveyed by Ernst and Young in 1991, fifteen ap-
ply a lower or a zero rate to basic foodstuffs and 20 partially or fully
exempt health services.19 Housing is more complicated. In general, most
VAT countries do not tax residential shelter.2° If the United States were
to adopt a value added tax, these three categories of consumption
food, shelter, and medical carewould be likely candidates for special
treatment. Table 6 presents distributional results for a VAT which zero-
rated these three categories of consumption. Two pictures emerge from
this table. First, removing these three classes of consumption from a
18See Table 5 in their paper.
19Only New Zealand subjects health services to a VAT. See Appendix A of Ernst and
Young (1991) for details.
20See Tait (1988) for a general description of the treatment of housing. The treatment of
real property in the United Kingdom changed after a court case brought against the
European Commission in the European Court of Justice. As a result of that decision, zero-
rating of buildings is largely confined to residential and charitable properties.
Value Added Tax5758Metcalf
TABLE 6.
Distribution of a VAT on Food, Medical Care, and Shelter Zero Rated.
Note: This table reports median tax rates by decile for different income measures. VAT liabilities per
household are computed as 5 percent of total expenditures minus food, shelter, and health expendi-
hires in the 1990 Consumer Expenditure Survey. Tax rates are computed as the ratio of VAT liability to
the appropriate income measure. Households are sorted by the income measure and the median tax rate
within each decile reported. There are 1,561 observations in the data set.
VAT would substantially diminish the revenue potential.21 Second, the
tax becomes substantially more progressive. Using annual income as a
base, average tax rates are nearly constant across the income distribu-
tion, rising from 1.65 percent at the low end to 1.77 percent in the middle
before falling back to 1.65 percent at the top of the distribution. Using
current consumption as a proxy for permanent income, the tax looks
decidedly progressive. The top decile median average tax rate is 2.3
times as large as the corresponding tax rate for the first decile. Adjusting
consumption for bequests reduces median average tax rates for all
deciles with the largest change occurring at the bottom and top of the
distribution. The top rate is now 2.4 times as large as the bottom rate.
Recently, Lester Thurow (1993) argued that a VAT could be made
substantially more progressive by allowing an exemption of $4,000 in
spending per person. A family of four would be able to exempt the first
$16,000 in spending from a VAT. With a 5 percent VAT, this exemption
would reduce their tax liability by $800. To capture the flavor of this
proposal, I consider a VAT with a $1,000 refundable credit per house-
hold combined with a VAT. I adjust the tax rate to raise the same amount
of revenue as a 5 percent VAT without the credit. Table 7 reports distribu-
21The Congressional Budget Office (1993) estimates that zero-rating these three categories
would halve the tax revenue from a VAT.




1 1.65 1.11 0.87
2 1.65 1.56 1.34
3 1.77 1.87 1.65
4 1.70 1.91 1.71
5 1.77 2.09 1.89
6 1.77 2.39 2.15
7 1.73 2.23 2.07
8 1.70 2.30 2.12
9 1.65 2.40 2.07
10 1.65 2.50 2.08TABLE 7.
Distribution of a VAT with $1,000 Refundable Credit.
Value Added Tax59
Note: This table reports median tax rates by decile. VAT liabilities per household are computed as 5
percent of the relevant base in the 1990 Consumer Expenditure Survey minus a refundable credit of
$1,000. Tax rates are computed as the ratio of net VAT liability to current consumption. Households are
sorted by current consumption and the median tax rate within each decile reported. There are 1,561
observations in the data set.
tional results where current consumption is used as a proxy for lifetime
income. If total expenditures are taxable, the VAT rate becomes 8.5
percent, whereas if food, shelter, and health care are excluded, the rate
becomes 10.3 percent. VAT burdens as a share of lifetime income are
now markedly progressive. If total expenditures are taxed, the median
average tax rate in the lowest decile is negative: these households tend
to pay less than $1,000 in VAT. The average tax rate rises sharply by
decile with the rate in the top decile now exceeding 7 percent. Excluding
food, shelter, and medical care leads to a subsidy for the median tax-
payer in the bottom three deciles. The top rate now is 5.8 percent.
Another way to think about the distributional effects of a VAT with a
$1,000 household credit is to consider what rate structure on a consumed
income tax would raise the same revenue and maintain the same Suits
Index as does the VAT with credit. I considered a three-rate, consumed
income tax where total expenditures are subject to a graduated rate
structure with break points at the 25th and 75th percentiles. We can
preserve revenue and the Suits Index with a rate structure of 2 percent,
6.5 percent, and 11.9 percent when current consumption is used to



















Distribution of a Consumed Income Tax on Total Expenditures.
This table reports median tax rates from a consumed income tax by consumption decile. The tax liability
per household is computed from a progressive rate schedule on a tax base of total expenditures in the
1990 Consumer Expenditure Survey. Individual average tax rates are computed as the ratio of tax
liability to current consumption. Households are sorted by consumption and the median tax rate within
each decile reported. There are 1,561 observations in the data set. Marginal tax rates are chosen to raise
the same amount of revenue as the VAT in Table 7 and have an equivalent value for the Suits Index.
with credit and exclusions for food, shelter, and medical care, rates of
0%, 4.2 percent, and 12.4 percent will suffice if total expenditures are the
base of the tax.Table 8 reports median average tax rates (with current
consumption in the base) for these consumed income taxes. For the tax
equivalent to a VAT on total expenditures, the bottom tax rate is set to
zero and the middle and top rate are set to raise the same amount of
revenue and preserve the Suits Index value, conditional on the marginal
rates increasing with income. It is not possible to construct a set of tax
rates that satisfy the above conditions with the lowest rate being zero.
The lowest value I can set the bottom rate and meet the required condi-
tions is 2 percent. Once various expenditures are excluded from the
VAT, it becomes possible to set the rate on the lowest bracket equal to
zero.
The Suits Index for a VAT on total expenditures with a $1,000 household credit is 0.243.
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There are two basic messages in these results. First, the conventional
wisdom that a value added tax is regressive is not correct when a
lifetime perspective is used. Second, there are relatively easy ways to
modify a VAT to increase its progressivity (in either the annual or
lifetime perspective).
5. CONCLUSION
A value added tax is viewed as being a regressive tax and has been op-
posed by many for its impact on the poor. This paper has argued that
when "rich" and "poor" are properly measured, a VAT may not burden
the poor substantially more than it would the rich. When a lifetime per-
spective is taken, a VAT on total expenditures is roughly proportional. In
addition, various modifications of a VAT could substantially increase the
progressivity of the tax. In this paper I have considered household credits
as well as the exclusion of various spending categories from the tax base.
The effect of these modifications on the distribution of a VAT can be quite
substantial, with the VAT now looking quite progressive.
In closing, let me note that the results discussed above are steady-
state results assuming households are subject to a VAT for their entire
lives. The transitory incidence of a VAT would be substantial and is
likely to be of considerable interest to policy makers. Imposing a VAT
today would lead to a substantial shift in taxes to current owners of
capital, many of whom are elderly. An alternative way to impose a
consumption tax like a VAT is via a wage tax.Although the steady-
state effects of a wage tax and of a comprehensive VAT would be
equivalent, a wage tax would exempt current owners of capital from
the consumption tax in the transition.
From a policy-making perspective, it may be more attractive to impose
a wage tax than a VAT and thereby avoid imposing a transitional burden
on the current elderly (and other capital owners). However, the wage tax
approach comes with an efficiency cost. A VAT can be viewed as a wage
tax with a one-time, lump-sum tax on existing capital. The lump-sum
nature of the tax reduces the dead-weight loss associated with the impo-
sition of the consumption tax. Moreover, the welfare gains resulting
from the lump-sum component of the VAT can be substantial.24
Referring back to equation (1), a wage tax is levied on the sources side of the lifetime
budget constraint, but a VAT is levied on the uses side.
24Auerbach, Kotlikoff, and Skinner (1983) have demonstrated in a large-scale simulation
model that imposing a consumption tax generates efficiency gains over a wage tax on the
order of 4 percent of lifetime resources.N signifies the number of observations in the regres-
sion. R bar squared is a regression statistic. The depen-
dent variable is spending per vehicle on new or used
vehicles among those households making a vehicle pur-
chase at some point in the year. There are 415 observa-
tions in the sample. See appendix for more details.
APPENDIX: IMPUTING ANNUAL VEHICLE
CONSUMPTION
My approach to constructing an annual measure of vehicle consumption
follows Cutler and Katz (1991). I begin by running a regression of spend-
ing per vehicle for those households that reported the purchase of at
least one vehic1e.The regression is reported in Table Al. Spending on
vehicles goes up with age, other expenditures (over the plausible range
of the sample), and after-tax income. Spending is also higher for smaller
families, and families with male or nonwhite heads of households. This
regression is used to impute the value of the new car each household
would purchase if it purchased a car that year. I then assume that cars
From the quarterly CEX data, I can construct an estimate of how many cars were
purchased over the course of the year.
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TABLE Al.
New Vehicle Purchase Regression.
Variable Coefficient










Male head of 322.89
household (604.26)





E2 .242depreciate in a straight line over an eight-year period and use that value
as the consumption value per vehicle on the household. Finally, I multi-
ply this consumption value by the number of vehicles owned by the
household.
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